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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States, like other wealthy countries, has fully embraced
electronic communications. Most individuals and businesses regularly use
some form of electronic communications, and they often use multiple types.1
*
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Geneva Yeargan Rand Distinguished Professor
of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. I would like to thank the participants at the
West Virginia University College of Law’s Conference on Zealous Advocacy for Social Change:
Transforming an Anti-Labor Environment into a Culture of Civility for their helpful comments
and Isaac Vargas for his research assistance.
1
See Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 5 (2014) (citing statistics on
workplace electronic communications usage).
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Given the prevalence of email; social media, such as Twitter and Facebook;
mobile phone messaging; and other similar modes of communication,
American society is clearly in an age of digital communications.
The workplace has not been immune to this digital revolution.
Employees and employers frequently use electronic communications for workrelated matters. The same is true for attempts by employees to improve their
wages and other work conditions. It is now the norm for unions or other groups
of workers to use electronic communications as part of an effort to organize or
change employers’ policies.
Although workers have used many types of electronic communications,
Facebook and other forms of social media have caught the public’s eye more
than any other.2 This is probably not surprising given the public’s widespread
familiarity with and use of social media. One benefit of social media’s public
attention is that cases involving this form of communication help to illustrate
labor law’s ability to protect nonunion employees.3 This not only provides
more appreciation for labor law, but also shows workers that they already know
how to use one tool that might help improve their work conditions.
In contrast to unions—which have great expertise in organizing
collective action—social media and forms of digital communications can be
crucial for unorganized workers. Because they typically lack any experience
with unions or other similar organizations, most workers do not have the
organizational expertise that is generally needed to instigate and maintain
collective action. Electronic communications can help fill that gap.
Most obviously, electronic media provides a low-cost and relatively
effective means of communication and organization.4 Although face-to-face
contact among workers is usually the most effective way to communicate and
solicit collective action,5 it is also quite limiting. For instance, when workers
lack organizational structure it is quite difficult to contact all employees—
particularly outside of the watchful eye of often retaliatory employers.6
Electronic media, when accessible, can allow workers to discuss workplace

2
Although this Article focuses on the use of social media for collective action, the highprofile nature of this medium is illustrated by the attention given to the recent election of a union
to represent bus drivers, employed by a contractor, who drive Facebook employees to and from
work. See Stephen Greenhouse, Facebook Shuttle Bus Drivers Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/facebooks-bus-drivers-vote-tounionize/?_r=0.
3

See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962).

4

See infra Part II.

5

See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the
Regulation of Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1091, 1108–11 (2011).
6

See infra note 204.
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issues and organize collective actions away from their employer’s watchful
eye.7
This Article explores some of the ways in which employees have used
electronic communications to seek better working conditions and argues that
this medium will continue to grow in importance. However, several factors
currently exist that limit the effectiveness of electronic collective action. In
addition to natural limitations on workers’ ability to use electronic media and
the effectiveness of those communications, this Article discusses the legal
protections that might help to reduce employer resistance to digital collective
action. This issue illustrates the Catch-22 of electronic communications: as
digital collective action strategies become more accessible and useful, they also
become more of a target for employers seeking to thwart employee attempts to
improve their working conditions. As described below, the legal protections for
workplace electronic communications have been in a state of flux. There have
been some recent legal gains for employees’ ability to use electronic
communications, but those protections still fall short in some areas. As
workers’ use of electronic communications becomes more widespread and
more effective, the need for legal protection will grow. Yet, pressure from
employers to resist an increasingly effective tool for employees will grow as
well. How this tension ultimately develops will depend on the ability of
legislators, regulators, and judges to balance these competing interests.
II.

COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS MEET THE INTERNET

Despite the widespread use of electronic communications, in many
ways digital collective action is still in its infancy. Unions and other worker
organizations, although certainly not eschewing electronic communications,
still rely heavily on traditional organizational strategies. These groups can and
should do more to take advantage of digital technology, but their continued use
of traditional strategies is understandable. For all the advantages that electronic
communications promise for collective action, there are still significant hurdles
to their effectiveness.
One limitation of electronic communications is the reality that they
generally are a less effective means of convincing workers to engage in
collective action than in-person communications.8 Moreover, even today, many
workers who might participate in collective action drives have little to no

7

See infra Part III. There is no guarantee that employers will not learn about electronic
organizational activity, even when workers do not use employers’ equipment or servers. For
instance, other workers could provide information or access to employers. See, e.g., Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 873, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that employees gave
manager access to other employee’s private, worker website).
8

See infra note 24.
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regular access to the Internet.9 This digital divide continues to shrink, but until
more low-wage workers regularly use such communications, it is difficult to
fault organizers’ reliance on traditional collective action strategies.
Although digital collective action strategies are still developing,
electronic communications have already played an important role in recent
organizing efforts.10 That importance will almost certainly grow as more
employees begin to regularly use such communications and worker-advocacy
groups broaden their reliance on digital media.
The usefulness of electronic communications centers on their ability to
lower the barriers to collective action. All attempts at collective action must
overcome various hurdles, but these problems are particularly acute for workers
who attempt to act together to improve their working conditions.11 Electronic
communications can rarely solve these collective action problems on their own,
but they can decrease the barriers—possibly enough to allow for more
collective action, or more effective action, than might otherwise exist.
The central barrier to collective action is that as groups increase in size,
their ability to act together generally decreases.12 This relationship results from
several factors, including the reality that individuals typically will not receive
enough personal benefit to justify the costs of engaging in concerted action,
even though the group as a whole would be better off.13 Similarly, because
individuals usually do not have to contribute to enjoy the gains from the
group’s activities, there is a free-rider problem that often makes collective
action unattainable or less effective.14 Other contributors to the inability of

9

For example, a White House report found that homeowners with college degrees are far
more likely to have home broadband availability than those who did not complete high school
(88% vs. 35%) and the same is true for households with higher incomes (annual household
incomes more than $100,000 (93%) vs. incomes less than $25,000 a year (43%), and individuals
of color (Asians (81%); Whites (74%); Hispanics (56%); African Americans (55%)). See THE
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY & THE NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, FOUR YEARS OF
BROADBAND GROWTH 8 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
broadband_report_final.pdf.
10

See infra Part III.

11

See infra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.

12

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 2, 11–12 (1965).
13
Id. at 34–36; Elinor Ostrum, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J.
ECON. PERSP. 137, 149–52 (2000). However, when the groups are small, collective action may be
easier to accomplish. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 4, 60 (1994)
14
See OLSON, supra note 12, at 28–31, 34–36; Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination
in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 753, 933 (1994).
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larger groups to engage in collective action include high start-up costs15 and the
difficulties in groups’, especially heterogeneous ones, ability to agree on
courses of action.16
These general collective-action problems are especially acute for
workers.17 For instance, changes in the labor market—including increased
worker mobility, diversity (which, while generally a good thing, increases
heterogeneity), and competition from abroad—make it more difficult for
workers to organize and act together.18 Moreover, employers frequently take
aggressive stands against worker collective action through retaliation, policies
that limit workplace communications, and other means.19
Attempts to organize workers must address these barriers. Two
important factors in whether attempts to organize collective action will be
successful are the ability of workers to obtain relevant information and to
communicate with each other.20 Electronic communications can, in appropriate
circumstances, significantly lower the cost of communication among potential
participants in collective action. This lower cost can increase the quantity and
quality of workers’ communications and coordination, which can increase the
chance of collective action occurring and its effectiveness when it does occur.21
Electronic communications can also improve workers’ access to
information. Among the benefits of information is its ability to provide workers
with a valuable tool to bargain effectively with their employers, either
individually or collectively.22 Additionally, information can also help mitigate

15
This early phase is particularly difficult because the promise of benefits is often small and
in the future, while basic organizational costs are large and immediate. See OLSON, supra note
12, at 22, 30–31.
16

Id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 250–51 (1992).
17

See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 219–26
(2001).
18

See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
CHANGING WORKPLACE 74–83 (2004); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Changing Face of
Collective Representation: The Future of Collective Bargaining, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 903, 916
(2007); Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1103–04.
THE

19
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 9–10, 71 (2000).
20
OLSON, supra note 12, at 46–47; Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace
Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 355 (2011); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and
Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 538–39 (2004).
21

DANIEL BAR-TAL, GROUP BELIEFS: A CONCEPTION FOR ANALYZING GROUP STRUCTURE,
PROCESSES, AND BEHAVIOR 72 (1990); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 18, at 918.
22

See, e.g., Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1240–43 (1966) (requiring
employers to provide unions with employees’ contact information before an election); Barenberg,
supra note 14, at 793–97 (noting that employee free choice depends on ability to deliberate over
relevant information, including disparate viewpoints).
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some of the general barriers to collective action. Individuals’ lack of awareness
about matters such as the preferences of other members in their group, the
potential rewards of collective action, or the legal protections for group
activity, will typically make collective action less attainable.23 Electronic
communications, by providing workers more access to this type of information,
can increase the likelihood that collective action will occur.
Digital media and other electronic communications, although not
perfect,24 promise an avenue of communication and information that could
surmount the barriers to collective action in some instances. This is true for
unionized workforces, where electronic communications allow for faster and
more efficient dialogue that, in some circumstances, can avoid employer
detection.25 But it is the nonunion sector where electronic communications
provide the most promise. Because this sector typically lacks an organized
workforce, electronic communications’ ability to lower the barriers to
collective action will usually provide more significant benefits.
III.

WORKERS’ USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

Given that Internet use is prevalent among the general public, it is no
surprise that electronic communication is becoming a more regular part of
worker collective action.26 Currently, electronic communications have not
reached their full potential and are usually only one among many strategies for
worker collective-action efforts. However, they can be particularly important
for nonunion workers, who often lack support from a labor organization.
Electronic communications can take an even more prominent role when
workers from different geographic areas or from different workplaces attempt
to work together.27 These differences can often be fatal to collective action

23

See Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1103–04 (discussing information
asymmetries).
24

Particularly for solicitation purposes, face-to-face communications are generally the most
effective, but only if an organizer has the opportunity to communicate with a given individual.
See Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1108–11.
25
For instance, the union president in Register-Guard used email to contact employees,
which is more thorough and quicker than personal contact or literature. Guard Publ’g Co.
(Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part, enforcement denied in part, 571
F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Unfortunately, because she used employer-provided email addresses—
and possibly because a recipient forwarded the emails—the employer became aware of the
messages and punished her. Id.
26

According to a Pew survey, as of 2014, 87% of adults in the United States use the Internet.
See Internet Use Over Time, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internetuse/internet-use-over-time/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
27

See Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1107.

2015]

WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

927

attempts,28 but electronic communications promise a means to bridge these
gaps.
A. Using Electronic Communications To Organize Workers
Although electronic communications hold the greatest promise for
nonunion workers, to date, many of the more high-profile instances of
workplace collective action have seen nonunion workers acting in tandem with
unions and other worker advocacy organizations.29 This is not surprising given
that unions have long advocated for all workers, even when they are not
directly trying to organize them.30 Moreover, traditional unions have been at the
forefront of efforts to use electronic communications to improve workplace
conditions.31
Unions have been using electronic communications for numerous
activities, such as providing information to members and to employees who
were targets of organizing drives.32 They later began using electronic
communications more actively to facilitate organizing strategies,33 as well as to
enhance political and communication efforts addressed to the broader public.
This experience has given unions the tools to assist nonunion workers in their
attempts to improve their working conditions.
As it does so often with workplace issues, Walmart provides a good
example of how the alliance between unions and workers uses electronic
communications. OUR Walmart (Organization United for Respect at Walmart)
is the primary organization pushing Walmart to improve its employment
practices.34 Although membership in OUR Walmart is made up of current and

28

See sources cited supra note 16.

29

See infra note 35 and accompanying text.

30

For instance, the AFL-CIO actively advocates raising the federal minimum wage. See
Minimum Wage, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Jobs-and-Economy/Wages-and-Income/
Minimum-Wage (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
31

Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the Internet to
Reviving Union Fortunes, in TRADE UNIONS: RESURGENCE OR DEMISE? 162–84 (Sue Fernie &
David Metcalf, eds. 2005).
32

Id.

33

For examples of NLRB cases that saw electronic communications as part of union
organizing efforts, see U-Haul Co. of Cal., 347 N.L.R.B. 375, 385 (2006); Frontier Tel. of
Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1277 (2005), enforced 181 F. App’x 85 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Michelle Amber, Union Loses First Attempts to Organize Pizza Drivers with Votes in Ohio,
Nebraska, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 227, at A-7 (Nov. 26, 2004) (discussing union that
started by using only electronic communications).
34
See About Us, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/mission-and-vision/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2015). See generally Stephen Greenhouse, On Black Friday, Walmart Is Pressed for Wage
Increases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/29/business/on-black-
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former employees, it has worked with the United Food and Commercial
Workers union, which disclaims any interest in organizing Walmart employees
to pressure Walmart.35
OUR Walmart’s strategies against the company include public
relations, informing workers, walkouts, and pickets—and it has used electronic
communications for all of them. For example, the OUR Walmart website
provides not only information about the organization, its goals, and
promotional material, but also numerous avenues for workers to participate.
Through the website, a worker can become a member of OUR Walmart36 and
obtain information about how to indicate a willingness to strike or engage in
other action,37 report instances of retaliation,38 inform workers of their rights,39
and sign a petition.40 The website also acts as a resource for interested parties to
contact a member.41 OUR Walmart and other groups seeking better conditions
for employees have also used sites such as YouTube to spread information
about their efforts.42 Moreover, OUR Walmart has a specific Facebook site

friday-protesters-demand-wage-increases-and-schedule-changes-from-walmart.html (describing
2014 Black Friday strikes).
35
See, e.g., Federal Labor Board Judge: Walmart Violated Workers’ Rights, UFCW (Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.ufcw.org/2014/12/10/federal-labor-board-judge-walmart-violatedworkers-rights/ (A disclaimer at the bottom of the page states: “UFCW and OUR Walmart have
the purpose of helping Wal-Mart employees as individuals or groups in their dealings with WalMart over labor rights and standards and their efforts to have Wal-Mart publically commit to
adhering to labor rights and standards. UFCW and OUR Walmart have no intent to have Walmart
recognize or bargain with UFCW or OUR Walmart as the representative of Walmart
employees.”).
36
See Employee Rights, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/your-rights/ (last visited Mar.
9, 2015).
37
See Get Involved, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/get-involved/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2015).
38
See Employee Rights, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/your-rights/ (last visited Mar.
12, 2015).
39

See id.

40

See The Declaration, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/the-declaration/ (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
41

See Talk to an Associate, OUR WALMART, http://forrespect.org/talk-to-an-associate-2/ (last
visited Mar. 9, 2015).
42

See, e.g., Eric Preston, Walmart Workers Flash Mob: Raleigh, North Carolina, YOUTUBE,
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FuCNH7dqZxg (video of “flashmob” at
Raleigh, North Carolina Walmart); bakunin888, Recent Victories Against Landlords and Bosses:
Seattle Solidarity Network, YOUTUBE, (Sept. 25, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
kE4uRP2PHwA (video by Seattle Solidarity Network, showing recent victories on behalf of
workers and others). As an example of the effect that OUR Walmart can have at times, recently
Walmart agreed to raise the wages of approximately 6,000 workers earning the minimum wage.
See Michael Rose, Wal-Mart to Raise Some Workers’ Hourly Pay; Advocates Stage Protests in
D.C., New York, DAILY LAB. REP., No. 200, at A-13 (Oct. 16, 2014).
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devoted to the so-called Black Friday strikes against Walmart; the site not only
contains information about the effort and calls for work stoppages, but also
urges action against individual stores accused of retaliating against workers.43
The pressure, among other factors, does seem to be having an effect. For
instance, in early 2015, Walmart announced that it would increase wages for
approximately 500,000 of its employees.44 Although one cannot directly credit
OUR Walmart’s efforts with the raises—an improved labor market, among
other factors, likely played a role—public pressure on Walmart seemed to have
some influence.45
OUR Walmart, although one of the most high-profile worker
organizations to use electronic media, is by no means alone. Other groups—
which typically cater to workers in a certain geographic, industrial, or skill
area—use similar tactics. For instance, the Seattle Solidarity Network (“SSN”),
part of a larger group of so-called “Solidarity Networks,”46 is a voluntary
organization that seeks to help workers in struggles with their employers,
landlords, and others.47 Much like OUR Walmart, SSN and similar
organizations rely heavily on their websites, online videos, and other electronic
communications to organize workers and get out their messages.48
Uber, whose online ride service has grown dramatically in the last
couple of years, provides another illustration of workers’ use of technology.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Uber has seen its drivers—which it classifies as
independent contractors—use electronic media as part of their dispute over
work conditions. In one instance, Uber cancelled its agreement with a driver
who had tweeted a link to an article that raised safety concerns from Uber
drivers.49 The driver’s story ultimately went viral, which forced Uber to
reinstate the driver.50 In addition, because of concerns about payments and
other issues, Uber drivers have been engaging in work stoppages in London

43

See Wal Mart Black Friday Strike, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/walmartblack
fridaystrike?_dr (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
44

See Kim Gittleson, Walmart To Raise Wages for 500,000
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31540472 (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
45

US

Workers,

Id.

46

See Other Similar, Allied, and/or Cool Organizations, SEATTLE SOLIDARITY NETWORK,
http://seattlesolidarity.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=89&Itemid=33 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
47

See
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
SEATTLE
SOLIDARITY
NETWORK,
http://seattlesolidarity.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10&Itemid=26 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
48

See SEATTLE SOLIDARITY NETWORK, http://seattlesolidarity.net (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).

49

Marina Fang, If You’re An Uber Driver, Don’t Tweet This Article. You Might Be Fired, IN
THESE TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17269/
uber_driver_fired_tweet.
50

Id.
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and major cities in the United States.51 Drivers, partially assisted by a union,
have organized these actions using many techniques, including electronic
media.52
Another recent example of nonunion employees using electronic
communications involved an extremely successful, and somewhat unusual,
collective action. After the widely admired CEO of Market Basket grocery
stores was ousted in a family business dispute, employees protested the move
by engaging in widespread protests and strikes, aided by a website and social
media such as Facebook and Twitter.53 The protest was ultimately successful,
as the pressure led to negotiations—assisted by the Massachusetts and New
Hampshire governors—that allowed the ousted CEO to purchase the
company.54 The employees’ use of social media was by no means the only
factor in the positive resolution of the dispute, but it was an important way for
activists to inform the public and over 25,000 employees, who were spread
across 71 stores in 3 states, about the protests and how to get involved.55
More novel forms of electronic collective action are also occurring. For
instance, a new French website—Macholand.fr—allows people to join others in
using Twitter, Facebook, or email to protest instances of sexism.56 Although
not limited to workplace issues, the site promises a new means to galvanize
workers and the public to act together in an attempt to improve working

51

See Rebecca Burns, The Sharing Economy’s ‘First Strike’: Uber Drivers Turn Off the App,
IN THESE TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014, 4:54 PM), http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/17279/
the_sharing_economy_first_strike_uber_drivers_turn_off_the_app.
52
See id. (noting drivers’ use of online forum and website); Jessica Plautz, Uber Drivers To
Schedule ‘Global Day of Protest,’ MASHABLE (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://mashable.com/
2014/10/22/uber-protests/ (noting call for strike via Facebook post).
53

See Julina Guo, A Backgrounder: The Market Basket Strike, ONLABOR (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://onlabor.org/2014/10/28/a-backgrounder-the-market-basket-strike/. However, the aim of
this action, affecting the choice of a CEO, would likely be unprotected by the NLRA. See NLRB
v. Oakes Machine Corp., 897 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1990); infra Section III.B.
54

See Guo, supra note 53.

55

Renee Richardson Gosline, Anatomy of the Market Basket Meltdown, BOSTON GLOBE
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2014/08/20/market-basket-meltdownviews-from-laura-sen-robert-reich-and-more/EIckAsHW0L8savR4TOqXXN/story.html
(describing importance of social media to Market Basket and other collective actions that target
consumers); Guo, supra note 53 (noting 90,211 “likes” on the Facebook page); see also Market
Basket Sale to Former Boss Ends Bitter Dispute, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28972536 (noting widespread use of #Marketbasket
hashtag on Twitter).
56
See Eleanor Beardsley, Egality N’est Pas La Réalité: French Women Wage Online War on
Sexism, NPR (Oct. 17, 2014, 3:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/10/17/
356948567/egalite-is-not-a-realite-french-women-wage-online-war-on-sexism.
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conditions for women, particularly with respect to harassment and other types
of discrimination.57
B. Using Electronic Communications To Inform Workers
Although the use of electronic communications as a tool to organize
and publicize collective action often receives the most attention, the promise of
greater access to information may ultimately provide the most substantial
benefit to workers. Typically, employers possess vastly more information than
workers. These information asymmetries can seriously undermine workers’
ability to bargain effectively with their employers, to know their legal rights,
and to learn how to effectively seek changes in work conditions.58 Electronic
communications can be an important gap filler in this area, as means both to
collect information and to distribute it to those who need it. The websites of
OUR Walmart, the Freelancers Union,59 and other groups show how useful
information can be made available to workers everywhere—in addition to more
directed messages to workers who have relationships with these organizations.
Thus, the next area of significant growth for workers’ use of electronic
communications is likely to be in the information-collection area.
There are many types of information that workers would find valuable
in their efforts to seek better employment conditions. Workers can use certain
information—such as workplace practices and policies, safety history, and
compensation—to determine an employer’s or industry’s relative quality with
regard to their treatment of workers. Similarly, this information, along with
knowledge of legal protections,60 can help workers gauge their employers’
compliance with labor and employment laws and, when appropriate, seek
enforcement.61 Electronic communications cannot provide workers with all

57

For instance, one Macholand issue was directed at the lack of women employed by a given
company. See Des Hommes Assistants ou Secrétaires? Ca n’existe Pas! [Male Assistants or
Secretaries? That Does Not Exist!], MACHOLAND, http://macholand.fr/des-hommes-assistants-ousecretaires-ca-nexiste-pas/, available at http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=fr&u=
http://macholand.fr/des-hommes-assistants-ou-secretaires-ca-nexiste-pas/.
58

Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What
Next for the NLRA?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1142–43 (2007).
59

The Freelancers Union has over 200,000 independent contractors, part-time workers, and
temporary workers as members. See Steven Greenhouse, Tackling Concerns of Independent
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/business/
freelancers-union-tackles-concerns-of-independent-workers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Among
the many services it provides for its members is a place to rate “clients” or employers. See Client
Scorecard, FREELANCER’S UNION, https://www.freelancersunion.org/client-scorecard/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2015).
60

See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.

61

See Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1140–41.

932

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117

relevant information, as employers will be able to keep some material
confidential, but they can greatly enhance the overall accessibility of such
information.
At this time, the most prevalent type of resource for online workplace
information is employer rating websites.62 Opinions about the quality of an
employer or supervisor can be valuable for workers, although there are limits to
the current websites’ usefulness. The quality and quantity of information on
these sites seems low, in part because no site has appeared to catch on enough
to attract a high number of workers willing to provide information. This means
that there is no information at all for many companies or jobs. And where there
is information, the number of entries is often so low that it is too difficult to
distinguish among legitimate comments, those of disgruntled employees, and
those of employers trying to boost their own ratings.
Although general information about management’s behavior is helpful,
other types of information could prove even more valuable. In particular,
certain objective information, such as wages, benefits, work hours, the
existence of covenants not to compete, safety records, and other terms and
conditions of employment could prove extremely useful for potential and
current employees. Knowing employers’ wages and other types of
compensation can have an especially positive effect, as that type of information
allows employees to compare their employer against other similar employers,
or compare their compensation to co-workers.63 Such comparisons can be
invaluable to employees attempting to pressure employers to raise wages.64
Although unions typically have compensation data in industries they
represent and use that information on behalf of their members, comprehensive
employee compensation information remains far less available in the nonunion
sector. There are some exceptions, as websites such as Glassdoor.com provide
information for nonunion employers that include salary, basic business facts,
and rankings and reviews from employees.65 This information can be quite
informative, particularly for larger companies that have a significant number of
62
See, e.g., supra note 59; RATEMYBOSS, http://www.ratemyboss.com (last visited Mar. 1,
2015) (site created by RateMyProfessor site).
63
See Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e)(3)(A) (2013) (improving
plaintiffs’ ability to bring pay equity claims under Title VII); Advancing Pay Equality Through
Compensation, 79 Fed. Reg. 20751 (Apr. 8, 2014) (ordering Department of Labor to create rules
that would require federal contractors and subcontractors to provide data on employee
compensation by sex and race).
64
See, e.g., David Leonhardt, I Am Lawyer, Hear Me Whine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/06/weekinreview/i-am-lawyer-hear-me-whine.html (describing
Greedy Associates and other online sites in which law firm associates shared salary information,
which helped to force their firms to pay higher salaries).
65
See GLASSDOOR, www.glassdoor.com/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); PAYSCALE,
www.payscale.com/?version=header&utm_expid=1482968-11.8K-SZJgeTS-L8iShJ4AraA.1
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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ratings and written reviews. But even for these larger employers, many specific
jobs have little or no information.66 Moreover, for most smaller employers, the
amount of information available is lacking in both quality and quantity. One
expects that over time, more information will be available, but it is unclear
when, or if, that growth will be enough to provide significant benefits to
workers.
Other types of information could also provide insights into employer
practices. For example, the AFL-CIO’s Working America organization appears
to have one of the more-developed employer databases, with data on over
400,000 employers’ labor and employment law violations, mass layoffs, and
offshoring practices.67 This type of compliance information is especially useful
for enforcement of labor and employment laws, which often suffers from
employees’ inability to learn about violations or seek redress.68 If sites like
Glassdoor and Working America can both expand the type of information they
report and the number of employers they have information for, workers could
begin to see significant gains. Moreover, worker-advocacy groups could try to
publicize this information to interested consumers which, especially for
companies that sell directly to the public, could greatly enhance workers’
ability to pressure employers. A related example of how this information
exchange could occur is the various apps that provide information to consumers
who care about various aspects of food production.69 It is not hard to imagine

66

For instance, Glassdoor, as of March 1, 2015, has 234 written reviews for my employer,
the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, including 25 ratings of the Chancellor. See
University of North Carolina Reviews, GLASSDOOR (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.glassdoor.com/
Reviews/University-of-North-Carolina-Reviews-E15010.htm. However, the campus has
approximately 12,000 employees, so 234 reviews (209 not including the Chancellor) is a very
small sample. See Information Sheet, UNC RESEARCH, http://research.unc.edu/offices/sponsoredresearch/resources/data_res_osr_infosheet/ (last updated Jan. 9, 2014) (noting 11,983 full- and
part-time employees as of 2013).
67

However, the site seems to have been offline recently without explanation. See Job
Tracker, WORKING AM., http://www.workingamerica.org/jobtracker (last visited Apr. 13, 2015)
(noting listings for over 400,000 companies); see also Amy Joyce, Labor Web Site Keeps Tabs
on Business: Workers Can Check Executive Salaries, Company Violations, WASH. POST, Nov.
18, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR20051117016
23.html; cf. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1142–43 (describing effects of information
asymmetries).
68
69

See, e.g., Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5.

See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Announcing the True Food Shoppers Guide
Mobile App (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/press-releases/792/
announcing-the-true-food-shoppers-guide-mobile-app; Seafood Recommendations, SEAFOOD
WATCH, http://www.seafoodwatch.org/seafood-recommendations/our-app (last visited Mar. 1,
2015).
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that in a similar app market for labor statistics, consumers would avoid making
purchases from companies that do not treat their workers well.70
Finally, electronic communications can help to inform workers of their
legal rights. Studies have shown that workers (and their managers) are typically
ignorant of their basic rights and liabilities.71 There is no easy way to reduce
this information gap,72 especially given the complexity of many labor and
employment laws, but electronic communications could help. For instance, as
more workers use work-related digital media, interested groups or government
regulators could use these channels to inform workers of their rights.
IV.

LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

Workers’ use of digital media holds great promise, but as that promise
becomes more of a reality, employers will become increasingly aggressive in
trying to limit workers’ ability to use electronic communications. Thus, the
effectiveness of workers’ use of technology will be highly dependent on the
extent to which the law can protect against employer retaliation and other
attempts to interfere with electronic communications.
Workers’ digital collective activity may enjoy protection under several
different legal regimes, including state statutory and common law, as well as
federal and state constitutions.73 However, reflecting its inclusion in a labor law
symposium, this Article will focus primarily on the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).74
As the public’s use of the Internet has become more widespread,75 the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) has seen an increased

70
See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Who’s Boycotting Wal-Mart This Holiday Season?, SLATE
(Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/11/23/wal_mart_boycott_strike_
prompts_liberal_boycott_but_do_boycotters_shop_at.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
71

There is a surprisingly large gap between employees’ (and managers’) knowledge of legal
rights and the actual rights that exist. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS
WANT 119 (1999) (finding that 83% of employees incorrectly thought that employers needed a
justification to fire an employee); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A
Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105,
134 (1997) (finding that approximately 80% to 90% of unemployed workers had incorrect beliefs
about employers’ ability to fire workers for various reasons).
72

Indeed, there is strong employer resistance to even the most basic of notice postings. See
Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking down NLRB’s noticeposting rule); Nat’l Assn. of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (same).
73

See, e.g., infra note 207.

74

For a thorough examination of similar protections for public-sector employees, see William
A. Herbert, Can’t Escape from the Memory: Social Media and Public Sector Labor Law, 40 N.
KY. L. REV. 427 (2013).
75

See survey cited supra note 26.

2015]

WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

935

number of filings related to digital media.76 Some of these disputes involve
novel issues for the Board, but in many respects these cases present a common
allegation that an employer has unlawfully interfered with employees’ NLRA
rights. As described below, employer interference typically involves
punishment that retaliates against employee action, communication policies
that restrict employees’ use of electronic equipment, and surveillance of
employees’ electronic communications.
The lawfulness of an employer’s interference turns on Section 8(a)(1),
which prohibits employers from retaliating against activity that is protected by
Section 7 of the NLRA or from chilling employees’ willingness to engage in
such activity.77 The following subsections address the starting point for the
Section 8(a)(1) analysis: whether employees’ actions were “concerted” and
“protected” under Section 7.78 Traditional examples of such activity include
discussing work problems or acting together to pressure an employer for better
work conditions.79
A. Concerted Electronic Activity
When employees discuss issues among themselves on Facebook or
through other electronic media, they are acting in “concert” just as much as if
they were talking with each other at a meeting or in a cafeteria at work. Thus,
electronic communications cases are often no different than any other
independent Section 8(a)(1) action.80 However, what constitutes concerted
activity can be more novel in the digital age. For instance, should hitting “Like”
on Facebook be considered concerted? In its recent Triple Play Sports Bar &

76

See Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online Communications and
Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957 (2012) [hereinafter Facebook] (analyzing 18month period, from June 2009 to April 2011, in which the NLRB received around 100 charges
from employees alleging that they were disciplined or fired for their work-related online
communications—finding that the majority of charges involved non-concerted griping).
77

Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013). Those rights are enforced through Section
8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of their Section 7 rights. Id. § 158(a)(1).
78

Id.; see also Sprague, supra note 76.

79

See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 18 (1962) (holding that
employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by firing employees who walked out of work because of
excessive cold).
80
An “independent” Section 8(a)(1) refers to employer action that violates only Section
8(a)(1), which is different from a “dependent” Section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice that the
NLRB automatically finds when an employer has violated other provisions under Section 8(a).
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Grille decision,81 the Board found that employees’ “Liking” another
employee’s Facebook posting, which complained about their employer’s tax
withholding practices, was concerted activity.82 Key to that finding was that the
understanding that “Liking” something on Facebook was a means to express
support for the original post; under the facts of the case, this meant that the
employees were discussing problems with their work conditions, which is
classic concerted activity.83
Although “Liking” and other forms of electronic communications may
fit well under the traditional concerted activity analysis, other types of digital
media present more complications. In particular, electronic communications
seem more likely to raise the difficult question of whether to treat an individual
employee’s action as concerted under Section 7. Unlike in-person discussions,
in which one employee’s complaints will usually result in a near-instant
response from another employee, electronic media cases often involve one
employee raising a work issue online and receiving responses to that comment,
if at all, after a delay of hours, days, or even longer.
The NLRB will classify an individual employee’s action as concerted if
the employee engaged in the activity “with or on the authority of other
employees,”84 or the action had the “object of initiating or inducing or
preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group action in the
interest of employees.”85 For example, an employee’s online post or email
could seek support from other employees to engage in a work protest or other
collective action. This type of concerted action occurred in Hispanics United of
Buffalo, Inc.,86 where several nonunion employees were fired because of an
individual employee’s initial Facebook post, and other employees’ subsequent
comments, that objected to another employee’s complaints to a manager about
their work. In its decision, the NLRB found that the employees were acting in

81

361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705 (2014).

82

Id. at *3 (describing ALJ’s finding, unchallenged by employer, that hitting the “‘Like’
button expressed his support for the others who were sharing their concerns and ‘constituted
participation in the discussion that was sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of’
protected, concerted activity”).
83
Id. Presumably, “favoriting” or “retweeting” a message on Twitter would enjoy the same
classification.
84
Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1983), remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 946–47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting elements of this type of Section 8(a)(1)
violation: (1) an employee’s activity was “concerted” under Section 7; (2) the employer knew the
activity was concerted; (3) the concerted activity was protected by the Act; and (4) the adverse
employment action was motivated by the concerted, protected activity).
85

Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).

86

359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *1–2 (Dec. 14, 2012).
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concert because several of them had made comments to the initial post.87 The
Board also stressed that the surrounding circumstances made clear that the
employees were acting together to defend themselves against criticism of their
work.88
Things get more complicated when, rather than trying to instigate
group action, an individual employee acts alone in an attempt to benefit fellow
employees. The NLRB will find concerted action in these cases only if the
individual employee’s action occurred in conjunction with, or with the
authority of, other employees.89 In Knauz BMW, the NLRB addressed this
classification’s intersection with social media.90 The case involved a salesman
for a BMW dealership who criticized his employer in two sets of photos and
comments on his personal Facebook page. One set of comments complained
that the quality of food at a customer appreciation event was too poor for a
luxury car brand. An ALJ found that these comments were concerted because
the salesman had previously talked to other employees about the low-quality
food; thus, the comments fell under the “in conjunction with” classification.91
However, had the co-workers not had those earlier conversations, the
employee’s Facebook comments likely would not have been concerted under
current Board law.
Notably, these cases and others illustrate that the NLRB has not
changed its basic approach to concerted activity, nor does it need to. Although
electronic communications may be more prone to implicate questions of
concertedness, the NLRB’s current analysis remains well-equipped to handle
these questions. Employees and their advocates, however, should remain aware
that electronic media often pose more pitfalls to garnering protection under the
NLRA.
B. Protected Electronic Activity
If employees’ actions are concerted they are still vulnerable to
employer retaliation or interference unless they are also “protected” by Section
87
Id. at *4 (finding also that termination was unlawful); see also Robert Sprague, Employee
Electronic Communications in a Boundaryless World, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 14–15) (describing other social media cases), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510919.
88

Hispanics United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *3.

89

Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Parexel International, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82
(2011) (finding Section 8(a)(1) violation when employer fired employee it suspected would
engage in concerted action in the future).
90
91

358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841 (Sept. 28, 2012).

Id. at *6, *10 (citing Meyers and noting that the sales employees’ compensation was tied to
the number of cars sold). The NLRB ultimately decided the case on a different issue. Id. at *21–
22.
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7. That provision, by its own terms, covers only conduct “for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”92 This coverage is
quite broad and, as a result, it is usually not difficult for employees to fit their
actions under Section 7. However, there are exceptions.
Most employee complaints, protests, or other concerted activity—
whether through electronic or more traditional means—are typically directed to
compensation, work hours, benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment.93 These goals fit squarely under Section 7’s “mutual aid or
protection” language, but matters are less clear when the aim of concerted
activity is not as directly tied to work conditions, or employees’ means of
engaging in concerted activity appear extreme.
The hallmark case for determining whether concerted action is for
mutual aid or protection is Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB.94 The case involved employee
leaflets opposing a proposal to put a right-to-work provision in the state
constitution and the president’s veto of an increase in the federal minimum
wage. The Court held that these aims were mutual aid and protection, even
though they did not directly affect the employees’ work relationship, because
they furthered employees’ interests generally.95 Eastex’s recognition that
political activity can be protected is important, for many types of modern,
electronic-aided protests involve attempts to change public policy.96 But there
are limits, as many subsequent NLRB and judicial decisions have found certain
actions that might indirectly help employees to be unprotected.97
One recent example of an employee’s electronic communications not
satisfying the mutual aid and protection test is Knauz BMW.98 Although the
employee in Knauz engaged in what was almost certainly protected activity by
complaining about the quality of a customer event and its impact on

92

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013).

93

See, e.g., supra Part II.

94

437 U.S. 556 (1978).

95

Id. at 566, 569–70.

96

See, e.g., Laura Shin, Fast Food Worker Protests over Minimum Wage Spread Across the
Globe, FORBES (May 15, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2014/05/15/
fast-food-worker-protests-over-minimum-wage-spread-across-the-globe/ (noting use of website
to aid international campaign to raise fast-food workers’ minimum wage).
97

See, e.g., NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1990) (trying to influence
selection of supervisor not protected); Local 174, UAW v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 1151, 1152 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (holding that promotion of political candidates is not protected); Orchard Park Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 643 (2004) (calling state health department not protected
because action concerned nursing home patients, not employees). See generally Paul E. Bateman,
Concerted Activity: The Intersection Between Political Activity and Section 7 Rights, 23 LAB.
LAW. 41 (2007) (stating that under current law, touting a particular candidate or party would not
be protected, but appeals to legislators for general workplace issues are protected).
98

358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841 (Sept. 28, 2012).
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salespersons’ compensation,99 the case ultimately turned on another of his
Facebook posts. That post, which the NLRB found was the reason for the
employee’s termination, made fun of an accident at another of the employer’s
car dealerships.100 As the Board found, this type of activity was not protected
because it did not seek to protect or benefit employees.101
In addition to issues with the aim of employees’ concerted activity, the
manner in which they act can also be important. The NLRB has long declared
that employees can lose protection under Section 7 if they engage in certain
types of concerted activity—even if it would otherwise be protected—in an
impermissible manner. It is hard to define precisely which conduct crosses the
line into unprotected status, as the Board typically examines each case on its
facts. But the most common examples involve conduct that violates criminal,
property, or tort law;102 breaches a collective-bargaining agreement;103 threatens
or harasses others;104 or is disloyal to an employer.105
The Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. case106 is a recent example of
how this doctrine can affect electronic communications. In Hispanics United,
the employer argued that it lawfully terminated employees for harassing
another employee through a Facebook post and comments.107 The employees
acted in concert with the aim of defending criticism of their work, which would
normally be protected, but the employer claimed that the post and comments
lost protection because they were harassing.108 Although the Board ultimately
rejected that allegation because there was not objective evidence of harassment,
abusive and harassing language is especially prevalent online.109 As a result,

99

See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.

100

The NLRB found that the termination was the result of Facebook posts that included
photos of an incident at the other dealership in which a salesperson let the child of a customer sit
in the driver seat of a car and the child drove the car into a pond; the pictures were accompanied
with captions that included “This is your car. This is your car on drugs.” Knauz BMW, 358
N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841, at *1 nn.1, 8.
101

See id. at *10–11 (ALJ finding that posts were not protected).

102

See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46 (1942) (work stoppage violated federal
criminal statute).
103

See Mohave Elec. Co-op. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183, 1190–91 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

104

See, e.g., Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984) (threatening nonstrikers).

105

NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953) (noting that
“[t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his
employer”).
106
359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769 (Dec. 14, 2012); see supra notes 86–88 and
accompanying text.
107

Hispanics United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *3.

108

Id.

109

Id. at *4 (stating that “legitimate managerial concerns to prevent harassment do not justify
policies that discourage the free exercise of Section 7 rights by subjecting employees to . . .
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employees must be careful not to let their emotions run too high when speaking
online because if their language is found to constitute harassment or abuse it
will typically fall outside Section 7.110
Even if communications are not harassing or abusive, they may fall
victim to Section 7’s disloyalty exception. Employers frequently push the
disloyalty doctrine, which arises from the Supreme Court’s holding in NLRB v.
Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard).111 In Jefferson Standard, the Court
held that the employer did not violate the NLRA by firing employees whose
picket signs disparaged their employer without tying the signs to a labor
dispute.112 The key to the ruling was that although employee criticism of an
employer as part of a labor dispute was permissible, criticism that seeks to
undermine the employer’s business without publicly explaining the criticism’s
connection to a labor dispute constituted disloyal conduct that was unprotected
by Section 7.113 Under the Jefferson Standard analysis, employees have great
leeway to criticize employers’ practices as long as they explicitly tie those
criticisms to a labor dispute. However, failure to make that connection clear
could eliminate NLRA protection, and any employer retaliation against the
unprotected conduct will go unremedied.114

The nature of social media and other digital communications presents a
very real risk of a disloyalty finding under the Jefferson Standard doctrine.

discipline on the basis of the subjective reactions of others to their protected activity” and that the
employer improperly terminated the employees based on another employees subjective claim
about feeling harassed (citation omitted)).
110

See, e.g., Felix Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1053–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting, in
case dealing with obscene employee statement, that Board determines whether employee conduct
loses Section 7 protection by using a test that looks to (1) the location of the employee’s
statement; (2) the subject matter of the discussion in which the statement was made; (3) the
nature of the statement; and (4) whether the statement was provoked by unlawful employer
conduct).
111

346 U.S. 464 (1953).

112

Id. at 476–77.

113

Id. at 477.

114

See MasTec Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2011 WL 3017454, at *5 (July 21,
2011) (stating that employee communications to third parties are protected when the
“communication indicated it is related to an ongoing dispute between the employees and the
employer and the communication is not so disloyal, reckless or maliciously untrue as to lose the
Act’s protection” (quoting Mountain Shadows Golf Resort, 330 N.L.R.B. No. 1238, 1240
(2000))); see also Five Star Transp., 349 N.L.R.B. 42, 46 (2006) (finding unprotected employee
statements that a non-union competitor to their school bus driving company employer was “substandard” and “reckless” in part because it had previously hired sex offenders).
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Employees often treat Facebook and other sites as private, even when they are
criticisms are part of a labor dispute.115 In addition, the extremely wide reach of
electronic communications makes employers even more likely to object to
online criticism. Employers almost never like employee complaints, but
concerns over physical picketing at an individual worksite pales in comparison
to the same message being broadcast over the Internet, where it can be picked
up by anyone. As a result, employers have increasingly argued that public
criticisms on social media sites leaves concerted activity unprotected under
Jefferson Standard.116 However, the NLRB thus far has found that comments
on Facebook and other social media sites—even those open to the public—are
more like conversations overheard by third persons, rather than
communications directed at the public.117 This conclusion will usually preclude
employees’ concerted activity from being considered disloyal and losing
protection under Jefferson Standard. Yet, it remains unclear whether the courts
will agree or whether the NLRB will consistently find that social media sites
are not public, especially if the Board shifts to a Republican-majority in the
future.
Another legal attack used by employers against social media criticism
is the defamation claim. Under its defamation analysis, the Board will consider
statements to be “maliciously untrue and unprotected, ‘if they are made with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity.’”118 One example of this issue occurred in Triple Play Sports Bar &
Grille, where an employee posted criticism of her employer’s tax-withholding
policies on her Facebook page, which led to a string of similar comments by
other employees and customers.119 The employer argued that because some of
the subsequent comments were defamatory, the employee’s initial post was
unprotected.120 The NLRB rejected this argument and concluded that it would

115

A further problem is that most nonunion employees have no idea that they might need to
tie their criticisms to a labor dispute.
116

See, e.g., Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4
(Aug. 22, 2014).
117

Id. at *5.

118

MasTec Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 2011 WL 3017454, at *5 (July 21, 2011)
(quoting TNT Logistics North America, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 568, 569 (2006), reversed. sub nom.
Jolliff v. NLRB, 513 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2008)) (finding that employees did not knowingly and
maliciously make statements to mislead the public); see Triple Play, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014
WL 4182705, at *5 (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53,
64–65 (1966)) (noting that NLRB analysis is based on the Supreme Court’s limitation of
defamation claims in the union organizing context to instances of damage and “malice,” which
involves knowingly or recklessly saying something false).
119
120

361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *4.

Id. (arguing, among other things, that statements suggesting that the employer had taken
portions of employees’ salaries that should have been submitted for taxes were defamatory and
disloyal).
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not hold employees liable for defamatory comments posted by others simply
because the employees were participating in the same discussion.121 This
finding is significant because, given the potential for third parties to post
defamatory comments, a contrary conclusion would have severely undermined
legal protection for employees’ use of social media.
C. Computer Use Policies
Although there has been an increase in the number of cases involving
employer retaliation against digital collective action, the biggest impact on
employer conduct may be the NLRB’s willingness to scrutinize company
electronic communications policies. The NLRB has long recognized that
general policies barring certain communications can unlawfully chill
employees’ protected speech.122 One common example is unlawful employer
“wage gag rules” that prohibit employees from discussing their pay.123 These
rules, like other employer policies, will violate the NLRA if they directly
prohibit protected activity, if the employer applies the policies against protected
activity, if employees would reasonably interpret the policies as barring
protected activity, or if the employer implemented the policies in response to
union activity.124
The NLRB’s willingness to apply this doctrine to electronic
communications policies creates some tension with employers’ concerns that
these communications might harm the company’s brand, lead to employer
liability for workplace harassment, and create other possible harms to the
business. Employers have criticized the NLRB for being overly aggressive in
striking down these policies and thereby leaving them unnecessarily exposed to
liability.125 However, the Board—particularly the General Counsel—has
illustrated how an employer can address its legitimate concerns with computer
use while remaining on the correct side of the law.126
One example of an employer going too far in trying to limit abusive
language and protect its reputation occurred in Knauz BMW. The employer in

121

Id. at *6 (stressing that the employees never alleged that their employer took their money).

122

See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp., v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646 (2004); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824 (1998),
enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
123

See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”:
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 187 (2004).
124

Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. at 646–47.

125

See, e.g., Lindsay Burke, The NLRB Strikes Down Employer Policies on Social Media and
the Confidentiality of Complaint Investigations, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://www.insideprivacy.com/social-media/the-nlrb-strikes-down-employer-policies-on-socialmedia-and-the-confidentiality-of-complaint-investi/.
126

See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text.
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that case had implemented a “Courtesy” rule that prohibited “disrespectful”
conduct or speech and that banned “language which injures the image or
reputation of the” employer.127 The NLRB concluded that this rule was
overbroad, especially the reputation language, because employees would
reasonably interpret it as prohibiting objections to their working conditions and
attempts to seek support from other employees to improve those conditions.128
Moreover, the Knauz policy did not “reasonably suggest” to employees that
protected Section 7 activity was not covered by the policy.129 This lack of
clarity was significant because the Board has been clear that ambiguous rules
“are construed against the employer.”130
In addition to Board case law, the NLRB’s General Counsel has issued
three memoranda on social media issues that help illustrate that office’s
approach to these cases and, possibly by extension, the Board itself.131 Of
particular use to employers is an examination of overly broad communication
policies.132 In the memorandum, the General Counsel helpfully explained why
he considered several employer policies to be unlawful.133 However, perhaps
the most useful aspect of the memorandum for employers is the description of
the case involving an employer—ironically, Walmart—that carefully
constructed a lawful policy that took care to avoid giving employees the
impression that they cannot engage in Section 7 communications.134 The
General Counsel relied heavily on the fact that Walmart’s policy clarified its

127

Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841, at *1 (Sept. 28, 2012).
The rule applied to electronic communications but was not limited to them. Id.
128

Id. at *1–2 (suggesting that merely requiring “courteous, polite, and friendly” criticisms
would be lawful); see also Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012 WL 3903806,
at *2 (Sept. 7, 2012) (finding unlawful a policy prohibiting “statements posted electronically . . .
that damage the Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation, or violate
the policies outlined in the Costco Employee Agreement”).
129

Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012 WL 4482841, at *1.

130

Id. at *2 (quoting Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 2012 WL 3993589, at
*2 (Sept. 11, 2012)).
131

See LAFE E. SOLOMON, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL
MEDIA CASES (May 30, 2012) [hereinafter SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT], available at http://mynlrb.
nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd; LAFE E. SOLOMON, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567; LAFE E. SOLOMON, REPORT OF
THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (Aug. 18, 2011), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743. Until the Board issues a decision
disagreeing with the General Counsel, as long as employers use policy language that the General
Counsel (which has prosecutorial discretion) finds lawful, they will not face an unfair labor
practice complaint.
132

SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 131, at 19–24.

133

Id.

134

Id.
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intended scope and provided examples to minimize confusion.135 Because the
policy was not ambiguous, the General Counsel found that the policy was
unlikely to lead employees to reasonably fear that protected activity was
prohibited.136 Employers are understandably concerned about their ability to
regulate activity on their email networks, but Walmart’s example provides
them a clear path for achieving their goals while avoiding liability under the
NLRA.
D. Employee Use of Employer Electronic Communications Equipment and
Systems
Although electronic communications provide an additional and often
effective tool for employee collective action, there are limitations to its value.
As noted, access to the Internet has long been a barrier to employees, albeit a
shrinking one.137 A further problem, however, is related to the fact that many
employees have access to the Internet either directly through their employers’
equipment or by communicating with each other via work-provided email
addresses. This reality gives employers a significant opportunity to limit
employees’ ability to use electronic communications. The NLRB has struggled
in its attempts to regulate employees’ access to employer electronic
communications systems—first by avoiding the issue altogether for many
years, then flipping from giving employers almost total authority to bar use of
their digital systems to recently giving employees a limited right to use such
systems.
1. The Right To Use Employer Email Systems
i.

The NLRB Initially Allows Employers To Ban Employees’
Protected Email

One of the key issues for employees’ ability to engage in electronic
communications is their access to employers’ computer systems. As explained
below, although this need may diminish over time, employee attempts to
communicate with each other often still take place on company systems. Yet,
whether employees have a right to access such systems has become a flashpoint
within the NLRB. Indeed, as this Article was being written, the Board altered
its approach to this issue by reversing an earlier decision and concluding that

135

Id. at 20.

136

Id. (noting that merely including a broad disclaimer was typically not sufficient to
eliminate confusion).
137

See infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.
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employees possess a limited right to use employers’ email systems for NLRAprotected speech.138
The NLRB first addressed whether, and to what extent, employers
could prevent employees from using work-provided electronic communications
systems in its 2007 Register-Guard decision.139 The employer in RegisterGuard had a policy that stated that its “[c]ommunications systems are not to be
used to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or political
causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related solicitations.”140 As is
often the case, this policy was observed in the breach, with many employees
openly using company email for personal solicitations and other messages.141
The employer, however, did enforce the policy against one of its employees,
the president of the local union, who sent union-related emails to employees’
work email addresses.142 The employer gave the employee written warnings for
violating the policy.143
Among the issues in Register-Guard was whether the employee had a
general right to use the employers’ email system for Section 7 purposes.144
Although the case seemed to fit easily under the traditional Republic Aviation
test for employee workplace communications, the Board established a much
different standard for employers’ control of their electronic and other personal
property.
In Republic Aviation v. NLRB,145 the Supreme Court approved a Board
rule that limited employers’ ability to stop employees from discussing common
concerns while at work. Under Republic Aviation and later cases, there is a
rebuttable presumption that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) if it restricts
employees’ oral discussions about Section 7 topics during nonwork time and in

138

See infra Part IV.D.1.ii.

139

Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part,
enforcement denied in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the employer’s electronic
communications policy did not apply to facts in case but not ruling on Board’s analysis).
140

Id. at 1111.

141

Id. (personal messages included baby announcements, party invitations, dog walking
services, and United Way solicitations).
142
Id. at 1111–12 (employee sent one email from a work computer and the other two emails
from a computer in the union’s office).
143

Id. at 1111.

144

Another issue was whether the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) by discriminatorily
enforcing its policy against union emails. In answering that question in the negative, the Board
significantly narrowed its discrimination exception in worksite communication cases. See id. at
1138.
145

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801 (1945), enforcing LeTourneau Co.
of Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1262 (1944).
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nonwork areas.146 The opposite presumption applies to written
communications, which employers typically can prohibit as long as employees
have some way to provide them to co-workers.147 Another line of cases—
Babcock & Wilcox and Lechmere—addressed employers’ ability to restrict
union organizers’ access to the worksite and emphasized that employees have
far stronger rights to engage in workplace communications than
nonemployees.148
When faced with this precedent emphasizing employees’ right to
communicate with each other on the employer’s real property, the NLRB in
Register-Guard concluded that a different rule should apply to use of
employers’ personal property. Indeed, the NLRB explicitly stated that
employees lacked any right to use employers’ electronic communications
equipment for Section 7 communications.149 This meant that employers had an
unfettered ability to prevent employees from using company-owned computer
systems—or even company-provided email addresses—as long as the
restriction does not fail an extremely narrow discrimination test.150 This ruling
imposed very few limits on employers’ ability to prevent employees from using
company email or equipment to communicate with each other. Yet it did not
last.
ii. The NLRB Reverses Course and Recognizes Employees’
Limited Right To Use Company Email in Purple
Communications
In its 2014 Purple Communications, Inc.151 decision, the NLRB
reversed Register-Guard’s approach to workplace emails.152 The employer in

146
See LeTourneau Co. of Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. at 1260; Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828,
843–44 (1943); see also TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001). An employer
can rebut the presumption by showing, for instance, production or disciplinary justifications. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 110 (1956).
147
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 617, 620 (1962) (noting that a parking lot
could allow for distribution).
148

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533, 541 (1992); Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at

113.
149

Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (2007).

150

Under the Board’s new discrimination definition in Register-Guard, employers can prevent
Section 7-protected activity as long as they treat communications of a similar type equally. Id. at
1117–18 (allowing, for instance, employer to exclude messages related to “membership
organizations,” but permitting messages about other organizations); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
Email and the Rip Van Winkle of Agencies: The NLRB’s Register-Guard Decision, in
WORKPLACE PRIVACY: HERE AND ABROAD—PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 61ST
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 204–09 (2009) (discussing and criticizing Register-Guard’s
discrimination analysis).
151

361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 1 (Dec. 11, 2014).
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Purple Communications had implemented an electronic communications policy
stating, among other things, that
[e]mployees are strictly prohibited from using the computer,
internet, voicemail and email systems, and other Company
equipment in connection with any of the following activities:
. . . [e]ngaging in activities on behalf of organizations or
persons with no professional or business affiliation with the
Company . . . [and] [s]ending uninvited email of a personal
nature.153
The union in Purple Communications objected to the policy in two different
ways. First, it sought to overturn a lost election based, in part, on the argument
that the policy interfered with employees’ Section 7 rights.154 Second, the union
filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the policy violated Section
8(a)(1) because employees had a right to use their employer’s email system.155
The Board, in an initial decision, overturned the election for reasons unrelated
to the email issue.156 A few months later, the NLRB addressed the unfair labor
practice issue in the case and reversed Register-Guard.157
In Purple Communications, the NLRB adopted a modified Republic
Aviation analysis. Under this analysis, the Board will “presume that employees
who have rightful access to their employer’s email system in the course of their
work have a right to use the email system to engage in Section 7-protected
communications on nonworking time.”158 As is the case under the traditional
Republic Aviation analysis, an employer may rebut this presumption “by
demonstrating that special circumstances necessary to maintain production or
discipline justify restricting its employees’ rights.”159 Examples of such special
circumstances might include bans on large video or audio files, as well as other
messages that interfere with productivity substantially more than a typical
email.160 But even when an employer can show that such circumstances exist,

152
The Board in Purple Communications expressly declined to address the discrimination
issue. See id. at 5 n.13.
153

Id. at 2–3.

154

Id. at 3.

155

Id. at 1–2; see also supra Section II.C.

156

361 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (2014).

157

Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 1. This decision will be referred to
simply as “Purple Communications,” because the earlier representation decision will not be
discussed further in this Article.
158

Id. slip op. at 14.

159

Id.

160

Id.; see, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (computer system’s performance harmed by spammer’s large volume of e-mail);
Washington Adventist Hosp., Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 95, 102–03 (1988) (finding that electronic
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the limitations must be “no more restrictive than necessary to protect the
employer’s interests.”161
The NLRB’s rationale for overturning Register-Guard flowed
primarily from Republic Aviation and basic common law.162 As the Board
recognized, Republic Aviation and subsequent Supreme Court and NLRB
precedent clearly required employers’ real property and business interests to be
balanced against employees’ Section 7 right to communicate.163 The one
exception was when nonemployee communications were at issue, in which
employers’ property interests automatically win out in virtually every case.164
But that exception did not apply in Purple Communications or Register-Guard
because only employee communications was at issue in those cases.
In Purple Communications, the Board emphasized that its decision in
Register-Guard undervalued employees’ right to communicate at work, while it
overvalued employers’ property interests.165 In particular, Register-Guard not
only gave unwarranted deference to employer interests, but also failed to
acknowledge that workplace communications were especially vital to
employees’ ability to exercise their Section 7 rights.166 More specifically,
according to the Board, Register-Guard also “inexplicably failed to perceive
the importance of email as a means by which employees engage in protected
communications.”167 Given the increasing importance of email to workplace
conversations, and the widespread employer tolerance of some personal use of
email, the Board in Purple Communications concluded that the need to
recognize protection for such communications was even more important than it

message was not protected by NLRA because it automatically appeared on computers and
required employees to delete it before disappearing).
161
Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 14 (stressing that “that an employer
contending that special circumstances justify a particular restriction must demonstrate the
connection between the interest it asserts and the restriction . . . [a]nd, ordinarily, an employer’s
interests will establish special circumstances only to the extent that those interests are not
similarly affected by employee email use that the employer has authorized”).
162

Id. slip op. at 4–5, 9–12.

163

Id. slip op. at 10–11; see also supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.

164

Id. slip op. at 10–11. In Purple Communications, the Board stressed that it was not
addressing nonemployee communications. Id. slip op. at 13.
165

Id. slip op. at 4.

166

Id. slip op. at 4–5. In its opinion, the Board cited, among other sources, Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491–92 (1978);
NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407
U.S. 539 (1972); LeTourneau Co. of Ga., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1260 (1944), aff’d. sub nom.
Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra
note 5, at 1101, 1124.
167

Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 4 (noting also that that importance
had grown since Register-Guard issued).
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had been in 2007, when the Board decided Register-Guard.168 Thus, the Board
decided to reverse its earlier decision and use the Republic Aviation standard
that applies other types of workplace employee communications.
Although the Board relied upon Republic Aviation, it recognized that
email has some differences from more traditional communications and adjusted
the Purple Communications analysis accordingly. For instance, unlike inperson communications under Republic Aviation, employees’ right to use email
does not depend on whether an employee sending or reading protected email is
in a work area.169 This is a sensible alteration, as there is little legitimate need
to protect work areas against email communications when employees already
use email for work purposes.170 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how the
Board or parties could apply a distinction between work and nonwork areas
when email is involved.171
The Board also refused to apply the traditional distinction between oral
solicitations and written distributions.172 Under NLRB interpretations of
Republic Aviation, employers can ban oral solicitations only in work areas and
during work time, but could ban written distributions virtually any place and
any time at work, as long as employees had some alternate means of
distributing the written material at the worksite.173 Email straddles the line
between oral and written distributions because it is written like a distribution
(without the litter problem that was part of the rationale for lesser protection of
written material)174 but can also be intended as a solicitation like oral
communications.175 Thus, keeping the distinction would have required the
NLRB to make complex determinations based on the substance of individual
emails.176 As a result, the Board wisely chose to abandon this distinction when

168

Id. slip op. at 6–8. The Board also distinguished and criticized earlier cases dealing with
employee use of employers’ personal equipment. Id. slip op. at 8–11; see also Hirsch, Van
Winkle, supra note 150, at 193–94 (criticizing equipment cases relied upon by Register-Guard as,
among other things, never substantively discussing issue).
169
Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 13–14. Under the Republic Aviation
analysis, employers can presumptively ban communications in work areas. See TeleTech
Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001).
170

See Hirsch, Van Winkle, supra note 150, at 200–01 (arguing for elimination of
work/nonwork area distinction for electronic communications).
171

See Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 31–34 (Johnson, M., dissenting).

172

Id. slip op. at 11–12.

173

Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616, 620 (1962) (noting parking lots and
entrance to company building).
174

Id.

175

See supra note 169.

176

Hirsch, Van Winkle, supra note 150, at 203 (discussing the NLRB Division of Advice’s
complex proposed analysis for distinguishing emails that are solicitations from emails that are
distributions).
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email was at issue. Indeed, a good case can be made that this distinction never
made sense in any situation,177 but the Board cannot be faulted for striking
down the distinction only as much as necessary to decide the case at hand.
Although the work area and written/oral distinctions do not apply to
email, in Purple Communications the Board did maintain the condition that
employees’ presumptive right to communicate at work is limited to nonwork
time.178 This will prove complicated in some cases because when employees
frequently use email, they often have jobs without clearly defined work and
break times.179 When that is the case, presumably, the Board will not allow the
employer to create a rule limiting email usage only to nonwork time, as that
would essentially gut the right espoused in Purple Communications. But, even
if this prediction becomes reality, there will be gray areas that the Board will
have to address.180
One peculiar aspect of Purple Communications is that the Board
limited its decision to employee emails, reserving judgment on other electronic
communications, such as texts or instant messaging.181 The Board was likely
trying to keep its decision narrow, but it will have to examine these other forms
of communication at some point and it is curious why it did not do so in Purple
Communications. When that time comes, it is likely that the Purple
Communications presumption will apply, as other forms of electronic
communication share enough characteristics with email to enjoy the same
presumption.182 However, one exception could be the use of an employer’s
social media or other public communications; unlike more personal emails and
texts, those types of communications can often be identified as the employer’s
own communications.183
The Board also refused to state that employees have a general right to
use employers’ email systems.184 This means that the Purple Communications
presumption applies only when employers provide employees permission to

177
See id. at 201–02 (arguing for elimination of oral and written communications distinction
in all cases).
178

Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 14–15.

179

Id. slip op. at 15 n.72; see also id. slip op. at 25 (Miscimarra, M., dissenting).

180

For instance, it may not be clear if there are time periods when an employer legitimately
expects employees to ignore personal emails.
181

Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 14 & n.70.

182

See id. slip op. at 22–23 (Miscimarra, M., dissenting) (noting importance of Facebook,
Twitter, and other social media for collective action); id. slip op. at 30 (Johnson, M., dissenting)
(arguing that rationale of majority decision applies to “any kind of employer communications
network”).
183
184

See id. slip op. at 14 n.70 (noting refusal to rule on social media).

Id. slip op. at 14–16 (noting also that it was not addressing nonemployees’ right to use
employer email).
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use company email.185 The limitation is an understandable concession to
employers’ interests in not extending email access to employees who do not
need it for their jobs. This limitation will prevent some employees from taking
advantage of email for protected communications, but it is unclear whether it
will be a significant number. In some cases, employers may choose not to
provide company email to avoid falling under Purple Communications, but that
is not likely to happen often in situations where employee collection action
would benefit from email access. That is because when employees frequently
use email for work—and, therefore, email will be especially effective for
protected communications—employers will be loath to restrict access and harm
their business operations.
iii. A Free Speech Objection to Purple Communications
It is worth briefly noting Member Johnson’s First Amendment
objection to the majority’s decision in Purple Communications. Member
Johnson argued that the decision conflicts with the First Amendment and
Section 8(c)186 of the NLRA because employers will have to pay for employees
to write and read speech that is hostile to them during working time,187 will
have to pay the “licensing, electricity, and maintenance bills” that allow the
writing and transmissions of employees’ hostile speech, and will have to pay
“fees and costs, plus the costs of incrementally adding more storage space” to
archive this speech.188 These arguments are unconvincing.
First, contrary to Member Johnson’s position,189 the costs involved
with allowing protected emails, if any, are miniscule at best; except for the
most extreme cases,190 hostile employee speech will be such a tiny percentage
of the overall number of workplace emails that the marginal cost will be
virtually zero.191 Second, Member Johnson’s concern proves too much. In
185

Id. slip op. at 15.

186

29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2013) (“The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit.”).
187
However, the majority decision clearly limited the presumption to nonworking time.
Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 15 (“The presumption that we apply is
expressly limited to nonworking time.”).
188

Id. slip op. at 56 (Johnson, M., dissenting).

189

Id. slip op. at 57 (Johnson, M., dissenting).

190

See supra note 160.

191

See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (“[B]ecause
the interest on which the constitutional protection of corporate speech rests is the societal interest
in receiving information and ideas, the constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting
the presentation of other distinct views clearly identified as those of the speaker is de minimis.”);
see also Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1122–23.
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particular, his attempt to tie this case to Harris v. Quinn192 falls flat. The
majority’s concern in the Harris dicta that Member Johnson relied upon—a
state employer’s agreement that employees must pay some dues to a union193—
is a far cry from a requirement that employers must allow employees to use
their pre-existing access to company email for NLRA-protected messages.
Indeed, his argument would make the Republic Aviation rule unconstitutional,
as that case also requires employers to “pay”—via the costs of owning and
maintaining real property—for employees to engage in hostile speech.194
The Purple Communications majority highlighted the problems with
Member Johnson’s argument by making an analogy to Google transmitting
Gmail messages, which no one confuses as speech created or paid for by the
company.195 Member Johnson responded that use of employers’ email systems
is different from Gmail because there is confusion about whether the messages
come from the employer, but he fails to explain why that is true other than
noting that the email address might include the employer’s account name.196
However, no reasonable employee—especially not one with even a passing
familiarity with his or her company’s email system—would think that such
messages are employer speech. Moreover, Member Johnson’s entire argument
is built on his objection to employers having to tolerate hostile speech. Yet,
how can anyone reasonably be confused about whether an employer sponsored
speech hostile to it? Finally, a further analogy may help illustrate the problems
with Member Johnson’s argument: the Federal Communication Commission’s
“must carry” rule, which requires cable companies to transmit certain local
broadcast channels.197 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected cable companies’
argument that the must carry rule unconstitutionally forced them “to transmit
speech not of their choosing.”198 Given that a company can be forced to carry
content from another company (and possible competitor), then surely an
employer can be required to allow employees to engage in NLRA-protected
speech through their pre-existing access to the company’s email system.
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134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).

193

Id. at 2628–34.

194

Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 16 n.78.

195

Id. slip op. at 16.

196

Id. slip op. at 58 (Johnson, M., dissenting) (noting the possibility of an “employer.com”
address and that his main concern is not confusion, but that an employer will have to subsidize
another’s speech).
197

47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2013).
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See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653–56 (1994).
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iv. The Impact of Purple Communications
At least until the White House changes political parties and the Board
flip-flops again, Purple Communications will remain the governing labor law
for employee email access at work. This new reality begs a larger question:
what is the impact of the Purple Communications rule? There is not a clear
answer to this question, a reality perhaps best illustrated by Member Johnson’s
dissent, which alternates between decrying the major harms that the majority
decision will cause and dismissing the decision as inconsequential.199
Contrary to Member Johnson’s claims, the impact on employers will
likely be small. Indeed, email is almost certainly the least costly form of
employee communication from the employer’s perspective.200 On the other
hand, where employees regularly use email, Purple Communications could
provide an extremely useful tool for employees to engage in collective action.
This is particularly true when employees’ access to electronic communications
is dependent on employer equipment. However, that condition will become less
true over time as more employees obtain their own access through smartphones
and other devices. Indeed, in many of today’s workplaces employees already
own their own mobile devices and have personal cellular plans that do not
require the use of any employer-owned system.201 As this trend grows, the
reach of Purple Communications will diminish.202 Yet, even if employees have
their own devices, using them for organizing purposes requires access to
employees’ email addresses or text numbers. Because employer email systems
make this type of information more readily accessible and usable, Purple
Communications will remain relevant for some time.203

199
To be more accurate (and perhaps more fair), Member Johnson sees the effect on
employees’ rights as minor and the effect on employers’ interests as significant. See, e.g., Purple
Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. at *61 (Johnson, M., dissenting) (stating that the Board has “created a
sweeping new rule that . . . threatens to undermine an employer’s right . . . to have a productive
workforce” and that the Board “should not be burning up government resources . . . by refighting
a war over terrain that indisputably no longer matters today to Section 7, if it ever did in the
past”).
200

See Hirsch, Communication Breakdown, supra note 5, at 1222–23.

201

Recent estimates are that just over half of U.S. employees own devices that they use at
work. See Rachel King, Forrester: 53% of Employees Use Their Own Devices for Work, ZDNET
(June 13, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/forrester-53-of-employees-use-their-owndevices-for-work/79886, cited in Sprague, supra note 87 (discussing blurring of distinction
between personal and work electronic communications).
202

See Christine Neylon O’Brien, Employer E-mail Policies and the National Labor Relations
Act: D.C. Circuit Bounces Register-Guard Back to the Obama Board on Discriminatory
Enforcement Issue, 61 LAB. L.J. 5, 12 (2010) (noting growth and advantages of employees’ use
of own electronic communication equipment).
203

Cf. NLRB Representation-Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74307, 74335 (proposed Dec. 15,
2014) (adding new requirement that “Excelsior lists”—which traditionally were home addresses
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2. Employer Surveillance of Email
Although in Purple Communications, the Board recognized employees’
right to use company email for Section 7 purposes, their freedom to exercise
that right is dependent in part on the risk of employer surveillance. On this
topic, the NLRB in Purple Communications helpfully provided guidance, even
though there was no direct surveillance issue raised in the case.
With their newfound right to use employers’ email systems, employees
must be cognizant of employers’ ability to monitor that email. Although
retaliating against employees for sending protected email is unlawful,
retaliation is already a common and hard-to-remedy problem.204 Moreover,
email monitoring can provide employers with information that is useful for
legal attempts to thwart collective action, such as employees’ goals and
strategies. Therefore, while electronic collective action provides many benefits
to employees, it also exposes those efforts in ways that traditional coordination
does not.
The risk involved for employees using electronic communications via
workplace equipment or systems is that their employers have easy access to
those communications.205 Many employees appear to have a false sense of
security when it comes to privacy—albeit one that may be diminishing as
recent consumer-related online security breaches get headlines.206 However,
employees need to understand that employers have significant leeway to

of employees eligible to vote in a union election—include employee email addresses if available
to the employer).
204

See Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 188 (2001) (arguing that Board damage awards in discharge cases
involve significant limits and delays).
205
Employers can also use other technologies to monitor employee activity, sometimes in
ways that provide information about protected activity. See William A. Herbert & Amelia K.
Tuminaro, The Impact of Emerging Technologies in the Workplace: Who’s Watching the Man
(Who’s Watching Me)?, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355, 370–86 (2008) (discussing global
positioning systems (GPS) and radio frequency identification (RFID) technology at work).
206
See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Home Depot’s 56 Million Card Breach Bigger Than Target’s, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets1411073571. Employees may have state tort claims for invasion of privacy based on employer
monitoring, but it is usually difficult to win such claims. See Ariana R. Levinson, Workplace
Privacy and Monitoring: The Quest for Balanced Interests, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377, 391–94
(2011) (describing state invasion of privacy tort). Also, public employees may have Fourth
Amendment claims, but those can be difficult to win as well, especially if employers notify
employees that they may monitor electronic communications. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560
U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (assuming, but explicitly refusing to decide, whether employee had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in sent texts); cf. Herbert, Can’t Escape, supra note 74, at 482–
502 (discussing constitutional protections for employees’ social media use); Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1597 (2012) (discussing First Amendment protections for public teachers’ social media use).
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monitor their computer systems. Indeed, the federal law most directly aimed at
maintaining privacy for online information, the Stored Communication Act,
provides employers with a significant exemption to search their own
communication systems.207
Labor law provides some protection against employer monitoring
through its surveillance doctrine, but it is unclear how much this helps. The
NLRB has long concluded that, absent special circumstances, an employer
violates Section 8(a)(1) by observing employees engaged in protected activity
or giving employees an impression that it is making such observations.208 This
rule attempts to prevent employers from chilling Section 7 rights through their
monitoring, or apparent monitoring, of employees engaged in protected
conduct.209 However, an employer can justify extra levels of monitoring when
it can show that a reasonable, objective justification for the surveillance.210
Even prior to Purple Communications, the NLRB’s surveillance
doctrine was relevant to electronic communications.211 However, in contrast to

207

Although the Stored Communications Act prohibits intentionally accessing stored
electronic communications without authorization, it provides exceptions for, among other things,
the monitoring of one’s own electronic communication systems. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)
(2013); see also William A. Herbert, Workplace Electronic Privacy Protections Abroad: The
Whole Wide World Is Watching, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379, 384 (2008); Ariana R.
Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for
the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 492–93, 526–29 (2012)
(describing possible applicability of Wiretap Act, as well as exceptions to Stored
Communications Act); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations
Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 38–40
(2000) (citing exceptions). However, the Stored Communications Act does provide more
protection against employer attempts to access employee communications from sites that it does
not own. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that employer’s unauthorized access to employee’s personal website may violate Stored
Communications Act, although noting that under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2), no violation would
exist if an authorized user provided access to the employer).
208

See, e.g., Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(stating that photographing or videotaping Section 7 activity has unlawful tendency to intimidate
employees). The Board will find that an unlawful impression of surveillance exists where, “under
all the relevant circumstances, reasonable employees would assume from the [employer’s action
or] statement . . . that their union or other protected activities had been placed under
surveillance.” Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1275–76 (2005).
209
Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271–72; Belcher Towing Co. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 705, 708 (11th
Cir. 1984) (noting that surveillance has “natural, if not presumptive, tendency to discourage
[union] activity”).
210

See Nat’l Steel, 156 F.3d at 1271 (citing legitimate security interests, gathering evidence
for legal proceeding, or reasonable anticipation of misconduct or violence).
211

See Frontier Tel. of Rochester, 344 N.L.R.B. at 1275 (finding impression of surveillance of
message posted on Yahoo! web page); Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1177–79 (arguing that
the NLRB could look to whether an employer’s monitoring of electronic communications
consists of normal screening for improper use (e.g., pornography or confidential information) or
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many instances of traditional surveillance—such as photography, videotaping,
and physical observation—it is very easy for employers to monitor their own
electronic communications systems and very hard for employees to detect such
monitoring.212 As a result, even though there has been a risk of violating
Section 8(a)(1), it is unsurprising that many employers regularly monitor
communications on their digital networks and equipment.213 Register-Guard’s
overly exuberant concern for employer personal property might have
exacerbated this problem by giving employers hope that the Board would
provide increased legal protection to engage in such monitoring. But in Purple
Communications, the NLRB clarified its approach to electronic monitoring by
emphasizing that its surveillance doctrine would apply to email, but suggesting
that a somewhat employer-friendly analysis would apply.
The Board explicitly stated that its Purple Communications rule “does
not prevent employers from continuing, as many already do, to monitor their
computers and email systems for legitimate management reasons, such as
ensuring productivity and preventing email use for purposes of harassment or
other activities that could give rise to employer liability.”214 These reasons are
sensible, as employers have valid concerns about these work-related issues,
especially given potential liability for electronic harassment.215 Yet, in
responding to employers’ concern that giving employees the right to use
employer email would unfairly subject them to liability under the surveillance
doctrine, the Board suggested that employers would retain broad protection for
their monitoring efforts.
The crucial aspect of the Board’s approach to electronic surveillance
was its comparison of email monitoring to the monitoring of public collective
activity.216 Under the Board’s traditional surveillance doctrine, it is lawful to
observe employees who publicly engage in collective action unless an
employer increases its normal monitoring or otherwise does something

whether the screening generally provides information about the content of communications and
the senders’ identities).
212

See Levinson, Electronic Monitoring of Employees, supra note 207, at 469–70 (discussing
employer electronic monitoring practices). Monitoring third-party systems, such as an
employee’s social media account, is more difficult for employers, although just as hard for
employees to detect. See infra note 223.
213

One 2007 survey found that 43% of employers monitored the email of its employees; 73%
of those employers use technology and 40% have individuals read email. AM. MGMT. ASS’N &
EPOLICY INST., 2007 ELECTRONIC MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE SURVEY (Feb. 28, 2008),
available
at
http://www.plattgroupllc.com/jun08/2007ElectronicMonitoringSurveillance
Survey.pdf.
214

Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 15 (Dec. 11, 2014).

215

Id.

216

Id.
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different in reaction to protected activity.217 Based on this public activity rule,
the Board in Purple Communications concluded that an employer can lawfully
gather information about protected collective action as part of its normal
monitoring of email.218
The Board’s approach is problematic for several reasons. First, it is not
obvious why email should be classified in the same manner as public activity.
Unlike picketing or other types of public acts, there is typically a veneer of
privacy that attaches to email. In other words, although employees may be
aware that their employer can monitor email, employees who send messages to
select individuals—as opposed to a company listserv or public social media
site—are actively limiting their audience in a way that traditional public
collective activity does not.219
Second, the Board’s approach seems overly broad, as it permits and
encourages employers to engage in widespread and comprehensive monitoring
as a matter of policy.220 As a result, employee communications will always be
known to such employers.221 That is always a risk when using an employer’s
email system, but by making such monitoring lawful, the NLRB is
undermining the very right to use email that it established in Purple
Communications. The policy underlying the surveillance doctrine is the
recognition that monitoring, or the appearance of monitoring, chills employees’
willingness to engage in collective action.222 By refusing to place limits on
employer monitoring of emails, including requiring prior notice,223 the NLRB
is allowing that same chilling to occur. Given that risk, the Board might have

217

Id. slip op. at 16 (citing Eddyleon Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 888 (1991)).

218

Id. slip op. at 16 & n.75 (stressing that increased monitoring in reaction to collective
activity, such as a union campaign, will still be unlawful).
219

The Board typically excuses observation of public collective activity because “[i]f a union
wishes to organize in public it cannot demand that management must hide,” Larand Leisurelies,
Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 197, 205 (1974), or that if “[u]nion representatives and employees who
choose to engage in their [u]nion activities at the [e]mployer’s premises should have no cause to
complain that management observes them.” Emenee Accessories, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 1344
(1983) (quoting Milco Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 812, 814 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1968)).
220
See Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 59–60 (Johnson, M., dissenting)
(criticizing majority for failing to provide employers more guidance on what kind of email
monitoring will be lawful).
221

See id. slip op at 60 (arguing that majority decision will mean that “it will be impossible for
an employer to effectively monitor employee use of email, without examining the content to
some degree, and creating the impression that it is surveilling union activity”).
222
See Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Frontier Tel. of Rochester, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1276 (2005), enforced, 181 F. App’x. 85 (2d
Cir. 2006).
223

The Board noted that employers could lawfully notify employees of monitoring for
legitimate reasons, but did not require it. Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip op. at 15.
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considered limiting employers’ general ability to read the substance of
employee emails, such as requiring the use of automated filtering software or a
legitimate business reason before a company official can read emails.224
Employer monitoring of employee electronic communications is also a
threat even when the employer does not control the communications systems.
Employees’ frequent use of social media to complain about work conditions
has not gone unnoticed by employers.225 When these sites are publicly
accessible, employers are free to read what their employees are saying, likely
without fear of a surveillance violation under the NLRA.226 Employees, of
course, can make access to their social media sites private in an attempt to
avoid employer monitoring. However, many employers have attempted to get
around these attempts to maintain privacy by, among other things, conducting
forensic searches of company equipment to find passwords for employees’
personal email accounts227 and even demanding that employees provide their
online passwords as a condition of employment.228 This latter tactic has become
enough of a real or perceived problem that 18 states have enacted statutes
banning employers from demanding that employees or job applicants provide
passwords to their personal online accounts.229 For employees in states without
this protection, aggressive employers risk only their reputation if they want to
demand such information and thereby stifle a significant outlet for employee
communications.
V.

CONCLUSION

The explosion in electronic communications over the last couple of
decades has transformed the way we communicate. This transformation has not
gone unnoticed by workers, who increasingly are using electronic
communications as part of their efforts to improve their work conditions.
224

See supra note 213 (noting employers’ use of technology to monitor email).
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See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 219; Facebook, supra note 76, at 1008–09 (noting also that it is unclear
whether the NLRB will find surveillance when a manager gains access to a Facebook posting
from a “friend” of the relevant employee, even though the manager lacks direct access to the
site).
227
See Sprague, supra note 87, at 19–23 (describing cases brought by employees under the
Stored Communications Act and state common-law privacy claims); Levinson, Workplace
Privacy, supra note 206, at 388–94 (discussing state statutes and common-law claims that might
give protection to employees’ electronic communications).
228
229

See Sprague, supra note 87, at 20–21.

See id. at 20–21 nn.135–37 (listing state statutes, as well as proposed statutes in 19 other
states and the U.S. Congress); see also Ariana R. Levinson, Social Media, Privacy, and the
Employment Relationship: The American Experience, 2 SPANISH LAB. L. & EMPLOY. REL. J. 15,
16–21, 23–25 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2265609 (discussing state and federal
constitutional limits employers’ viewing employees’ and applicants’ social media sites).
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However, in most cases, reliance on technology has played a small role in
worker collective action. In order for workers and their advocates to take full
advantage of the possible benefits of electronic communications, they must
explore new ways that technology might aid their attempts to communicate
with the public and other workers, as well as to collect and share information.
One of the barriers to the expansion of workers’ use of electronic
communications are employers, who often have strong interests in limiting or
monitoring these communications. Labor and other laws are still developing
ways to ensure that workers have the opportunity to use technology as part of
their collective actions, while also balancing the legitimate business concerns
of employers. Recent advances in NLRB law have improved this balance by
providing employees with more access to workplace electronic
communications, but there is still a great deal of uncertainty and opportunity
for employer interference. Ultimately, however, the law can only accomplish so
much. If workers want to be able to take full advantage of the digital age, they
must take the initiative and develop more and better uses of modern
communications technology.

